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Abstract 
 
This paper examines whether, and to what extent, the spot LNG markets in different regions (East 
Asia, Iberia, Northwest Europe, and South America) are integrated and how market integration 
evolves over time. We first lay out a framework of market integration in the context of global LNG 
market where the main supplier (e.g. Qatar) may have market power. Estimating a time-varying 
coefficients model, we find that a varying degree of market integration exists between all four 
LNG indices particularly after the Fukushima incident in 2011. We complement the time-varying 
coefficient analysis with a test of price convergence among the LNG indices using the Phillips-Sul 
(2007) methodology. The results reveal that, there is strong evidence that the spot LNG prices are 
converging after the Fukushima accident and they are also converging with the price of NBP in 
the UK. The empirical result is consistent with the change of market power of the main supplier. 
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1. Introduction 
Traditionally, international trade of liquefied natural gas (LNG) has been characterized by 
long-term contracts that last for 20-25 years, under which a limited number of sellers supply certain 
regional or country markets with minimum “take-or-pay” requirements. 1  These long-term 
contracts leave little flexibility for market arbitrage. As the industry expands, market players have 
sought more flexibility, in terms of both price and quantity, in order to arbitrage across different 
LNG markets. Consequently, the spot and short-term LNG trade has grown. As shown in Figure 
1, the volume of LNG traded on the spot and short-term markets has grown steadily in recent years 
and reached 69 million tons per year in 2014, accounting for 29 percent of the total LNG trade 
worldwide.  
In this paper, we take a first look at the emerging spot and short-term LNG markets.2 We are 
particularly interested in investigating whether, and to what extent, spot LNG markets in different 
regions are integrated, how market integration evolves over time, and how the spot LNG markets 
interact with the more mature natural gas market in the United Kingdom (UK).3 If the spot markets 
are integrated, the law of one price (LOOP) will hold in that prices in different regions will differ 
only by transportation costs. We primarily examine the degree of market integration by comparing 
four regional spot LNG price indices, namely, the East Asia Index, the Iberian Index (Spain and 
Portugal), the Northwest Europe Index, and the South America index. We estimate a time-varying 
coefficient model to test the LOOP among the four regional indices, which is then complemented 
by a test of convergence over time employing the convergence test developed by Philips and Sul 
                                                          
1 See Griffin (2006, Chapter 1) for a complete discussion of the LNG business model. With a take-or-pay contract, 
the buyer either takes the product from the supplier or pays the supplier a penalty if he/she does not take the product. 
2 Short-term contracts are those with a duration of less than four years, also see Hartley (2015). Hereinafter, we refer 
to both spot and short-term trade as “spot market”.  
3 We omit the US market from the empirical analysis as the shale gas revolution effectively made the US 
disconnected from the rest of the world over the sample period.   
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(2007). We also test for integration between the regional LNG markets and the National Balancing 
Point (NBP) price in the UK.  
Using weekly data for the period of 02 August 2010 to 27 February 2015, we find varying 
degrees of integration not only among the four regional LNG spot markets, but also between the 
regional spot LNG markets and the UK natural gas market. Moreover, our results from the Phillips 
Sul (2007) convergence test further reveal that, the spot LNG prices are converging towards the 
end of the sample period and they are also converging with NBP price in the UK. The convergence 
test results are consistent with predictions from a model where the major producer (e.g. Qatar) has 
market power and the market power changes following an extremely large demand shock such as 
the Fukushima accident.  
Our study is related to the growing literature on the integration of natural gas markets. The 
existing work on the regional integration of natural gas markets (e.g. De Vany and Walls, 1993; 
King and Cuc, 1996; Cuddington and Wang, 2006; Neumann et al., 2006) generally finds that, in 
North America, the gas market liberalization in the 1980s stimulated its market integration but a 
fully integrated gas market between the east and west regions is yet to come. In Europe, the 
opening of the interconnector between Belgium and UK facilitated price convergence between the 
UK market and the largest continental European market (the Zeebrugge), but the continental 
European market is still loosely integrated at best. As for the global integration of natural gas 
markets, studies have variously found no integration or rising integration across regions, 
depending on geographic area and sample periods used. Siliverstoves et al. (2005) perform 
cointegration analysis on the prices of imported gas in Europe, North America and Japan from 
early 1990s to 2004 and show that the European and Japanese gas markets are integrated but not 
with the North American market. Brown and Yucel’s (2009) examination of weekly natural gas 
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prices across the Atlantic from 1997 to 2008 indicates a long-run cointegrating relationship 
between the Henry Hub and the NBP prices. However, they argue that the cointegrating 
relationship is driven primarily by the comovements with crude oil prices rather than gas-on-gas 
competition.  
The papers closest to ours are Neumann (2009) and Li et al. (2014). Applying the Kalman 
filter to three natural gas spot prices in the US (the Henry Hub), the UK (the NBP) and the 
continental Europe (the Zeebrugge) markets, Neumann (2009) provides evidence for a movement 
towards market integration between 1999 and 2008. She also confirms that, while LNG may have 
reinforced the linkage between markets, the observed price comovement is again largely driven by 
their correlations with crude oil prices. Recently, Li et al. (2014) apply the convergence test 
developed by Philips and Sul (2007) along with the Kalman filter to monthly natural gas prices in 
the US, UK and three East Asian markets (Japan, Korea and Taiwan) for the period of January 
1997 to May 2011. They find a clear divide between the North American market and the rest of 
the world. Specific to the LNG market, Ritz (2014) develops a model and argues that if a producer 
has market power in two regional markets, prices could differ by more than the transportation cost. 
The model helps explain the observed price gap between Asia and Europe from 2011 to 2013. 
Our work departs from existing studies by focusing on the integration of spot and short-term 
LNG markets. While previous studies have postulated a role for LNG in strengthening the linkage 
among different regional natural gas markets, the extent to which spot LNG markets across regions 
integrate remains unexplored. 4  In this paper we provide the first empirical assessment of 
integration among different spot LNG markets. There has been considerable debate, especially in 
                                                          
4 In Li et al. (2014), an average of spot and long-term contract prices is used for Japan and only the Asia markets 
(Japan, Korea and Taiwan) were included. Here in this study we focus on the spot LNG markets across both the 
Pacific and Atlantic markets.  
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anticipation of LNG exports from the US, about whether internationally traded natural gas pricing 
will remain regional or become global as is the case with crude oil. A related question is whether 
the latter will lead to the decoupling of gas pricing from oil-indexation and eventually a shift to 
gas on gas competition (see, for example, Rogers (2012), Stern (2012) and Rogers and Stern 
(2014)). However, a “global” gas market will not occur if the market for LNG, which is still the 
only feasible means of transporting gas in large volume across oceans, remains regional. In a recent 
study, Hartley (2015) argues that increased liquidity in the spot and short-term markets will reduce 
short-term fluctuations in spot prices while an increase in the numbers of buyers and sellers of spot 
LNG cargoes could both increase spot market liquidity and reduce geographic price differentials. 
Thus, to better understand the future trajectory of the market integration for internationally traded 
gas, it is especially relevant and important to assess the evolution of integration among spot and 
short-term LNG markets as well as their interactions with the more mature natural gas markets.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of the 
LNG market. Section 3 lays out a conceptual framework of market integration in the context of 
spot LNG market where the producer’s market power is considered based on the Ritz (2014) model. 
The data and empirical methodology are described in Sections 4. Section 5 presents the estimation 
results, and concluding remarks are offered in Section 6.                           
2. Overview of the LNG market 
The LNG market was traditionally divided into the Pacific Basin and Atlantic Basin, with 
minimal trade between the two. In the Pacific Basin, Japan, Korea and Taiwan are historically the 
main LNG importers due to their lack of indigenous supply and disconnection from gas-producing 
continents, although China and India have been rapidly catching up in recent years. Japan is by far 
still the largest importer of LNG in the world. In 2015, Japan imported 118 billion cubic meters 
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(BCM) of LNG, accounting for 35 percent of the total world trade volume. 5  Indonesia and 
Malaysia used to be the major exporters in the Pacific Basin market but have been surpassed, in 
terms of export volume, by Qatar and, to a lesser extent, Australia. The pricing of long-term LNG 
contracts in Asia has historically been tied to the price of crude oil (Li et al., 2014) with certain 
formulas. For example, the price of Japanese imported LNG is indexed with an S-curve to the price 
of the so-called Japanese Crude Cocktail (JCC), which is an average price of a basket of crude oils 
imported to Japan.6       
Historically, the main importers in the Atlantic Basin were the US, Spain, Italy, and France, 
with Algeria and Libya being the principal suppliers. Since the late 1990s, the Atlantic LNG 
market has expanded dramatically. New liquefaction facilities have been built or added in Egypt, 
Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Norway, and Trinidad and Tobago, while new regasification 
capacity has been added in the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and elsewhere in Europe, and 
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in South America. In terms of pricing, due to the liquid natural gas 
markets in the UK and US, LNG imported to UK and the US Gulf coast (prior to early 2010) has 
to compete with supplies from local markets, which has led to a true gas-on-gas competition in 
these markets.7 As a matter of fact, the pricing of imported LNG in the UK, even under long-term 
contracts, is often linked to the prices of NBP. In contrast, the pricing of gas imported to continental 
Europe, both through pipelines and via LNG, has been traditionally linked to oil-based products, 
                                                          
5 Unless otherwise noted, the data in this section are all sourced from BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 
various years.  
6 JCC more correctly stands for the Japanese Customs-cleared Crude. The purpose of the S-curve is to mitigate the 
price risk so that when the price of crude oil is high the formula would adjust to the benefit of the buyer and when 
the price is low it would adjust to the benefit of the seller.  
7 This was true when substantial LNG was imported to US Gulf Coast prior to early 2010. However, once the “shale 
gas revolution” made such imports rarely profitable, US LNG imports have largely been restricted to end of pipe 
markets where local prices can become disconnected from the Henry Hub price.   
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such as diesel oil or residual fuel oil, with an adjustment of the natural gas price to reflect changing 
market conditions for these oil-based products.    
In the past decade or so, the LNG business has undergone some profound changes in both 
the scope of markets and the mode of transactions. First, as more countries enter the market as 
either an importer or an exporter, the once-segmented markets start to connect. For example, in 
2008, there were few LNG flows between the Pacific Basin and Atlantic Basin. In 2015, Nigeria 
alone sent 12.3 BCM of LNG to the Asia Pacific, representing 45 percent of its total LNG export. 
Of particular importance is the surge of Qatar as the largest LNG exporter. Qatar has drastically 
boosted its production capacity. Between 2007 and 2011, Qatar increased its LNG export capacity 
by nearly three times, making it the highest in the world at 77 million tons per year. It has become 
the largest LNG exporter since 2007 and has been exporting to both Asia Pacific and the Atlantic. 
Thanks to the location, Qatar and other LNG exporters in the Middle East play an important role 
in connecting the two regional markets.   
Second, the US “shale gas revolution” has significantly reduced the quantity demanded from 
the Atlantic basin. As noted by Li et al. (2014), as recently as in 2008 the US was widely deemed 
as one of the major LNG markets and much of the global investment in new LNG liquefaction 
plants and shipment was targeted to the US market. However, thanks to the “shale gas revolution”, 
US domestic production has boomed and consequently the demand for LNG import has 
dramatically reduced. In 2015, the US imported only 2.6 BCM of LNG, 12 percent of its level in 
2007. Instead of becoming a major importer, the US is now on its way to becoming an exporter.  
Third and most importantly, an increasing share of LNG is now traded in spot markets or via 
short-term (less than 4 years) contracts rather than fixed long-term contracts. Because of market 
fragmentation, high capital intensity and asset specificity, traditionally the majority of LNG 
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projects were committed to a specific market under long-term contracts.8 While the long-term 
contracts can help sellers mitigate the risk of being displaced when cheaper or closer gas sources 
become available and buyers from being forced to pay a high price when markets tighten, they are 
fairly inflexible, especially in the face of demand uncertainty. Originally, the spot and short-term 
trade were typically limited to either cargo diversion, which is often due to unforeseen changes in 
demand, or volumes in excess of long-term contractual commitment due to debottlenecking of 
production capacities (see Griffin, 2012, pp. 53-56). However, as the market expanded, both 
buyers and sellers have started to seek contractual flexibility in order to explore arbitrage 
opportunities in the natural gas markets, which gives rise to increasing trade in spot and short-term 
LNG markets. As shown in Figure 1, the share of spot and short-term trade in total LNG trade has 
grown from a little over 10 percent in 2000 to nearly 30 percent in 2014.  
3. Market Integration in LNG Markets 
3.1 The Concept of Market Integration  
The idea of market integration and the law of one price (LOOP) centres on the concept of an 
economic market. The classic definition of market due to Cournot is “A market for a good is the 
area within which the price of a good tends to uniformity, allowance being made for transportation 
costs.”9 This definition of an economic market has been used to motivate a voluminous literature 
on testing variations of the LOOP such as market integration and purchasing power parity in 
international finance. For example, Stigler and Sherwin (1985) employ “the similarity of price 
                                                          
8 An LNG project includes the development of often multiple gas fields which are in many cases located in isolated 
places, a liquefaction plant and a fleet of specially manufactured LNG tankers.  
9 This definition was expounded by Marshall “The more nearly perfect a market is, the stronger is the tendency for 
the same price to be paid for the same thing at the same time in all parts of the market; but of course if the market is 
large, allowance must be made for the expense of delivering the goods to different purchasers; each of whom must 
be supposed to pay in addition to the market price a special charge on account of delivery” (Marshall, 1920, p. 270). 
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movements within the market” as the criterion of testing a market. Spiller and Huang (1986) 
emphasize the role of arbitrage in linking two markets and relate to the concept of antitrust market. 
Cuddington and Wang (2006) further defines market integration as “Assuming transactions 
(including transport costs) are stationary for the time period under consideration, k locations are 
said to lie within a single (unified or integrated) market, if (small) shocks to supply or demand 
from any location in the market cause equal price changes at all k locations.” In this paper, we 
follow this more or less standard definition of market integration.  
Let Pit and Pjt be the LNG prices at market i and j respectively, and Tji the transportation cost 
(arbitrage cost) from j to i.10 For convenience, let’s assume Pi > Pj. When Pi – Pj < Tji, then no 
arbitrage opportunity arises between market i and j. The prices are independent in that a small 
shock in i would have no impact on Pj.11. The markets are segmented due to high transportation 
cost. If Pi - Pj > Tji,, in the absence of trade frictions, arbitrage would push down Pi and push up 
Pj. In equilibrium, the LOOP holds in that prices between the two markets differ by only 
transportation cost Pi – Pj = Tji and the two markets are said to be fully integrated.  
3.2  An LNG Market Model12 
Specific to the LNG market, Ritz (2014) develops a static model and shows that the regional 
price differential can be different from transportation cost if the main supplier, such as Qatar, has 
market power in the two markets. Let 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 and 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 denote the spot prices of LNG in market i and j 
respectively, and Ti, Tj the unit transportation cost for the supplier to ship LNG to the markets. Ritz 
(2014) shows that  
                                                          
10 Tji could include other transaction costs. In what follows, we will also refer to Tji as arbitrage costs to distinguish 
the transport cost from producing country to markets.  
11 That is the autarky price in Spiller and Huang (1986) and Kleit (1998).  
12 The model is directly from Ritz (2014). We recap the model predictions here. The setup and derivation of the 
model is presented in the appendix. 
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)],                 (1) 
where 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 denote the price elasticity of demand faced by the supplier in market i.13 The price gap 
between the two markets is determined by not only the transportation cost but also the supplier’s 
market power. The result follows from the first order-condition of the main supplier’s profit 
maximization problem where the supplier equalizes the marginal revenue from additional spot 
trades, not necessarily the prices, across the two markets. 
Two important implications follows from Equation (1).  First, if the supplier has no market 
power in both i and j, 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 → ∞, then Pi – Pj = Ti – Tj. Thus, in equilibrium, the price gap between 
the markets i and j is equal to the transport cost differential. Note, in this case there is no arbitrage 
opportunity between the two markets as 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 − 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖14. However, the two markets should still be 
regarded integrated as the supplier is able to arbitrage between the two markets such that a shock 
in one market would have an impact on the price of the other.  
Second, if the supplier has market power in the two markets, then the prices could differ by 
more than the transportation cost. For example, if the producer has equal market power in the two 
markets such that 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 = 𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗 = 𝜂𝜂 < ∞, then the price gap  becomes 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 –  𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 =
(𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖−𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗)𝜂𝜂
(𝜂𝜂−1)
. The supplier’s 
market power in the two markets amplifies the price gap that is caused by transportation costs. On 
the other hand, if the transportation costs from the supplier to the two markets are identical, then 
the result reduces to  
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖−𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
=  𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖−𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗
(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖−1)𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗
 . In this case, 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 > 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗  if and only if 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 < 𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗 . That is, the 
supplier could charge a higher price in a market where the demand is less elastic. Note, in both 
                                                          
13 This is the elasticity of demand faced by the supplier (i.e. the residual demand) and should be higher than 1. The 
market level demand elasticity could be significantly lower.  
14 If 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 − 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 > 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ,then the supplier is better off to ship via market j to i.  
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cases the no arbitrage condition implies that 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  must hold in equilibrium and the 
preceding discussion on market integration still applies.15  
Although the main purpose of this paper is not to test the Ritz (2014) model, the above 
discussion provides some useful insights for our empirical analysis. First, if the market is perfectly 
competitive, we expect the prices of LNG across spot markets to differ by the costs of shipping 
LNG from producing countries to the relevant markets and the markets are fully integrated. Second, 
when the market is less competitive, as likely the case during the period immediately following 
the Fukushima accident in 2011, the prices across markets could differ by more than the transport 
costs, but should be bound by the no arbitrage condition. In next section, we will first test whether, 
and to what extent, the spot LNG markets are spatially integrated as implied by perfect competition. 
This is followed by a test of whether the markets converge to a competitive equilibrium after the 
Fukushima accident.  
4. Data and Empirical Methodology 
4.1 Data Description 
The data used in this study was generously provided to us by ICIS. ICIS publishes daily 
market prices in over two dozen locations based on information collected by their reporters and 
analysts from market participants about spot transactions and spot bid and ask levels in the absence 
of actual transactions. According to ICIS (2014), their price assessment methodology “is designed 
to discover the tradable value of a commodity at a particular point in time. The single value 
represents the price at which the commodity is most likely to transact. As transactions are not 
                                                          
15 When 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 < 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 , even if the two markets are served by the same supplier, a small shock in one market would 
have no impact on the other unless the residual demand elasticity is so low that a small shock would cause the 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 >
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 . The markets are integrated when 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 . This is possible when the arbitrage cost is relatively low so that a 
shock in one market can affect the price on the other.  
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regular for many LNG destinations, the value frequently represents a point in between the highest 
firm bid and the lowest firm offer. The published price does not always represent the midpoint of 
this bid/offer spread and ICIS uses its knowledge of market direction and market length/tightness 
to determine value in all instances where the firm bid/offer spread is more than 10 US cents wide 
and there is no confirmed transaction.” 16  The prices from ICIS are quoted as either DES 
(Delivered ex-ship, meaning the seller or supplier arranges shipping), or FOB (Free on board, 
meaning the buyer pays the costs of transportation and arranges shipping). The former represents 
the price most likely to transact at a specific delivery point, which is typically the most active spot 
cargo receiving terminal, within the named region. Given the fact that spot LNG markets are still 
relatively thin compared to the spot natural gas markets in the US or UK,17 in this analysis we use 
the weekly averages of the following four regional spot LNG indices.18   
 The East Asia Index (EAX) is the arithmetic average of the day’s DES front month and second 
month ahead assessed prices for Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China; 
 The South America Index (SAX) is the arithmetic average of the day’s DES front-month and 
second month ahead assessed prices for Argentina, Brazil and Chile;  
                                                          
16 One concern with these price assessments is their reliability, i.e. whether they truly reflect the value of spot market 
trades. In relation to oil market, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in collaboration 
with the International Energy Agency (IEA), International Energy Forum (IEF), and the Organisation of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), published a report in October 2012 which set out principles “intended to 
enhance the reliability of oil price assessments.” These principles were “developed with due regard for the specific 
nature and dynamics of price assessments in the physical oil market.” Subsequently, in 2014 and 2015, IOSCO 
published reports on the Implementation of the Principles for Oil Price Reporting Agencies (PRAs).
 
The reviews 
focused on the four main PRAs which includes ICIS and concluded that the “PRAs have instituted processes and 
procedures to implement the principles and good progress has been made. The external assurance reviews that were 
conducted corroborated IOSCO’s view at the time that PRAs had policies and procedures in place that are consistent 
with the PRA Principles.” (IOSCO, 2015).    
17 For example, it is estimated that approximately 1000 cargos were traded on spot market in 2011.  That is, on 
average, less than 3 cargos per day were traded.  
18 The indices are defined by ICIS and quoted by industry publications.  
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 The Iberian Index (IBX) is the arithmetic average of the day’s DES front-month and second 
month ahead assessed prices for Spain and Portugal; and 
 The Northwest Europe Index (NWE) is the arithmetic average of the day’s DES front-month 
and second month assessed prices for Britain, Netherlands, Belgium and France.  
Our sample starts from August 2, 2010, the earliest date that we can obtain a continuous time 
series, and ends at the week of February 23, 2015, with a total of 239 weekly observations. To get 
a sense of the structure of spot LNG markets worldwide, we calculate the market share of each 
regional spot index as the average share of import volume by the relevant region in total spot LNG 
trade over the period of 2011-2014. As shown in Figure 2, East Asia dominated the world market 
with a share of nearly 60 percent followed by South America with a share of 11 percent. The two 
European markets collectively account for 13 percent of the world spot LNG market.  
4.2 Preliminary Analysis 
Figure 3 plots the time paths of the four regional spot LNG indices along with the NBP and 
Henry Hub (HH) prices, all of which are expressed in $/MMBtu terms.19 The regional spot LNG 
indices appeared to move closely with each other and also with the NBP before March 2011, after 
which the EAX jumped to a higher level, and the SAX followed suit with a lag of about three 
months. The jump of the EAX was obviously triggered by the loss of nuclear power in Japan 
following the March 11, 2011 earthquake and the Fukushima accident, which was replaced largely 
by natural gas along with coal and oil-fired capacity.20 The increase of the SAX in June 2011 also 
                                                          
19 Nominal prices are used in this study. We also tried using real prices where we deflate the nominal prices with US 
CPI. The results are not materially different. Because the highest frequency for CPI (or other deflators) is monthly, 
we linearly interpolated the CPI data to weekly. The results are available from the authors upon request.  
20 In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami, Japan lost 12 gigawatts of nuclear power. By the end 
of 2011, Japan was left with only 7.98 GW, or 16.3% of the pre-crisis nuclear capacity of 48.96 GW at 54 reactors 
and that capacity was shut down too by May 2012 (Platts, 2012). According to EIA data, Japanese electricity 
generation from nuclear power reduced from 280 GWh in 2010 to 156 GWh in 2011, and a mere of 17 GWh and 14 
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coincides with the subsequent shut-down of other nuclear power plants in Japan since June 2011. 
The IBX and NWE also increased in the second half of 2011, but the increase was not as 
pronounced as the EAX and SAX. Although the price gap between the EAX and the European 
indices can be as large as $10/MMBtu, the Asian and European spot LNG markets still show clear 
signs of comovements with each other. Despite large price differentials between mid-2011 and 
late 2014, the four regional spot LNG indices appear to be converging again towards the end of 
our sample period. Note that the NWE index closely mirrors the NBP price, which probably 
reflects the fact that much of the long-term LNG import is indexed to the price of NBP in this area 
and the spot LNG price simply adjusts to changing conditions in natural gas markets. It is also 
worth noting that the Henry Hub price seems to evolve on its own, fluctuating independently of 
other indices around a much lower price level. During the study period, there were no operational 
LNG exporting facilities in the lower 48 states of the US or Canada.21 The significant increase in 
natural gas production thanks to the “shale gas revolution” has displaced imports and depressed 
the price of natural gas in North America, and consequently, the Henry Hub market is essentially 
disconnected from the rest of the world. In what follows, we will omit the Henry Hub price from 
the analysis to save space. However, the result is available from the authors upon request.     
In Panel A of Table 1 we apply three unit root tests to the logarithm of the four LNG indices 
as well as the NBP index. Hereafter we designate the logarithms of the price indices by labels that 
begin with the letter “L” (e.g. LEAX for the logarithm of EAX). The unit root rests we use include 
the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, the Philips Perron (PP) test, and the Kwiatkowski-
                                                          
GWh in 2012 and 2013 respectively. Further, according to BP Statistical Review, natural gas consumption in Japan 
jumped 12% from 2010 to 2011 and another 7% from 2011 to 2012. 
21 During the study period, the only LNG exporting facility in North America is the Kenai LNG plant in Alaska 
which is disconnected from the mainland US or Canada. In any case, it was mothballed from mid-2011 to the end of 
the study period. See http://alaska.conocophillips.com/newsroom/news-releases/Pages/kenai-lng-plant.aspx and 
http://www.platts.com/latest-news/shipping/anchorage/conocophillips-to-resume-lng-exports-from-kenai-21478299.  
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Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests. 22 While the ADF test and the PP test cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that LEAX, LIBX and LSAX are nonstationary at levels, the KPSS test rejects that they 
are stationary at least at the 10 percent level. We interpret that LEAX, LIBX and LSAX are 
nonstationary. Both the ADF and PP tests reject the null of unit root at the 10 percent level for 
LNBP and the KPSS test fails to reject the null of stationarity, suggesting LNBP is stationary. For 
LNWE, the results are more indecisive, but there is some evidence to suggest that it is stationary. 
Although the PP test cannot reject the null of nonstationarity even at the 10 percent significance 
level, the ADF test is able to reject at the 5 percent level. The KPSS test rejects the null of 
stationarity at the 10, although not the 5 percent level.  
Following previous studies, we also test for cointegrating relationships for each pair of the 
four logged LNG indices. As shown in Panel B of Table 1, there is some evidence of cointegration 
between the pairs of LIBX-LSAX and LSAX-LNWE, but not for others. However, given the 
somewhat conflicting result in the unit root test for LNWE and the relatively short time spans of 
our data, the cointegrating relation found in LSAX-LNWE should be read with caution as they 
may not necessarily reflect the true long-run equilibrium relations. Nonetheless, the lack of 
cointegration between LEAX and the other three indices suggest the spot LNG market is not well-
integrated during the sample period. In what follows, we re-examine the relationships using an 
empirical methodology that does not require the data to be cointegrated.    
4.3 Empirical Methodology 
To evaluate the degree of market integration among regional spot LNG markets, we take a 
two-step approach to examine the relations among different regional spot LNG price indices. We 
                                                          
22 Before the unit root analysis, we applied tested Bai and Perron’s method (1998, 2003) for testing structural breaks, 
and found no statistically significant evidence of structural breaks in any of the regional spot LNG indices when 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors were used. 
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start with a test for the LOOP, as implied by the arbitrage conditions in Section 3.1, by estimating 
time-varying regression coefficients for each pair of regional spot LNG indices and also between 
each spot LNG index and the NBP index. We then proceed to test for price convergence among 
these indices with a method recently developed by Phillips and Sul (2007).23 While the time-
varying coefficients can shed light on how well the market is integrated at each point of time, the 
Phillips-Sul convergence test provides insight to whether these regional spot LNG indices are 
transitioning towards a common long-run equilibrium. An appealing feature of both methods is 
that neither relies on assumptions about the stationarity of the time series.  
4.3.1 Test for the LOOP 
While we don’t have time series data on transportation cost by routes, it is reasonable to 
assume the transportation cost differential between markets are proportional to the level of price.24 
The LOOP can be empirically tested with the following specification: 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                        (2) 
where 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 are respectively the price indices (in natural logarithm) in region i and j, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 
captures the price differential between the two regions due to transportation costs, and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 is the 
regression coefficient.25 When 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗= 0, the price change in market j has no effect on price in market 
i and hence the two regional markets are segmented. When 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗=1, there is unit elasticity between 
the two prices and the two regional markets are said to be fully integrated. The closer 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 is to one, 
                                                          
23 This convergence test has recently been applied by Li et al. (2010, 2014) to examine price convergence in 
international coal and gas markets. 
24Tanker charter and fuel costs are the two main components of the transportation cost. Since LNG tankers use LNG 
and fuel oil as fuel, it is reasonable to assume the fuel costs to be proportional to the price of LNG. As for the tanker 
charter costs, our monthly data on spot LNG tanker charter rate indicates it also fluctuates with the price of LNG. 
For example, the correlation coefficient between the logged tanker charter rate and the EAX index is 0.66 over the 
sample period.  
25 Hereafter we use P to denote price levels and p to denote the logged prices.  
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the more integrated are the two regional markets. Note Equation (2) assumes immediate price 
adjustments and constant relation between two prices. To capture the dynamics in price adjustment 
process and better understand the evolution paths of price relationships, one can also estimate a 
time-varying coefficient regression model for two regional prices:26  
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡        (2.1) 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡                        (2.2) 
where 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡~ 𝑁𝑁�0,𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2 � and 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡~ 𝑁𝑁�0,𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝜐𝜐2 �.  
In this system, the regression coefficient 𝛽𝛽 is allowed to vary with time. When the variance 
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝜐𝜐2  is zero, however, the 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 coefficient is simply reduced to a constant. This model can be 
estimated using the Kalman filter. Specifically, the 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗  and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 coefficients are first estimated 
using information up to t-1 and then their estimated values are updated by incorporating prediction 
errors from the previous step when information at time t becomes available. In what follows, we 
report results based on equation (2.1) and (2.2). The estimation is conducted using the Oxmetrics 
software. The initial values of parameters are based on OLS regression. 
4.3.2 Phillips-Sul Convergence Test 
In their seminal work, Phillips and Sul (2007) argue that if a group of time series is 
converging towards a long-run equilibrium but the speed of convergence is not fast enough to 
reach the full convergence before the end of the sample period, the cointegration test may not be 
able to detect the comovement in the data. They designed a framework where each time series 
within the group is decomposed into a permanent common factor representing the aggregated 
common trend of the group and a transitory idiosyncratic component capturing individual 
                                                          
26 Some authors (e.g. Slade, 1986; Asch et al., 2006) also introduced lagged prices to Equation (2) to model the 
dynamics in price adjustments. 
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deviations from the common trend. They further developed a regression-based convergence test 
methodology which allows one to test whether a group of time series converge to a long-run 
equilibrium path or a common trend while allowing for temporary individual divergences from the 
long-run equilibrium.27  
The method can be readily applied to testing whether prices in different regional markets are 
converging over time. The idea is that if the markets in question are undergoing the process of 
integration during the study period, it is more likely to be accomplished towards the end of the 
sample period because in the earlier period, trade volume is low and market barriers such as 
incomplete information, constraints in transportation and legal barriers may segment the market 
(Li et al, 2014). As the trade volume grows over time and market barriers diminish, no arbitrage 
opportunities imply that the prices in different regions would converge to the LOOP in equilibrium 
(Spiller & Huang, 1986; Padilla-Berna et al., 2003). Furthermore, in our context the change of the 
producer’s market power should also be considered as two large demand shocks occurred in the 
early part of the study period. First, as aforementioned the Fukushima accident in 2011 drastically 
increased the demand for LNG in Japan. Second, there was a negative demand shock in Europe in 
2012-2013 both as a result of post global financial crisis recession and the switch to coal for 
electricity generation as coal prices fell.28 Together these imply the demand elasticity for the 
leading supplier, Qatar, is much lower in Japan than in Europe in the period immediately following 
the Fukushima accident. As the effect of the shocks lessened over time, we conjecture the LNG 
market converges to perfect competition.  
                                                          
27 A more detailed description of the procedure can also be found at Li et al. (2010, 2014). 
28 We thank an anonymous referee for this point. The LNG import in Europe fell by 25% from 90.7 billion cubic 
meters (BCM) in 2011 to 69.3 BCM in 2012 and another 25% to 51.5 BCM in 2013. It gradually recovered in 2014 
and 2015 (BP, various years; also see Koyama, 2013). 
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Recall that under perfect competition the price gap between two markets is equal to the 
difference in transportation costs: Pi – Pj = Ti – Tj. If the prices converge over time to a competitive 
equilibrium, we expect the following to hold   
lim
𝑠𝑠→∞
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗+𝑠𝑠
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗+𝑠𝑠
= 1 − 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗, for all i and j,                                                                   (3) 
where 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 =
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 – 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
. 29 Phillips and Sul (2006) shows that the convergence in N series can be tested 
by constructing a cross-sectional variance ratio, H1/Ht. Specifically,  
𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 =
1
𝑁𝑁
∑ (ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 1)2𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1  , where  ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 =
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
1
𝑁𝑁
∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1
 .                    (4) 
Here hit traces the transition path of price Pit in relation to the cross-sectional average at time t and 
Ht is the cross-sectional variance at t. The convergence among prices implies that Ht should 
converge to zero and, as a result, the variance ratio, H1/Ht, would approach infinity.  
Therefore, the null hypothesis of convergence can be tested by estimating the following 
equation: 
log( 𝐻𝐻1
𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗
) − 2 log 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏 log 𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡                                            (5) 
where L(t) = log(t+1), t = [rT], [rT]+1, …, T, and r is the fraction of data to be excluded from the 
regression.30 Under convergence, log(H1/Ht) approaches infinity as t goes to infinity. Convergence 
among the prices series pit can be conveniently tested on the coefficient b with a null hypothesis 
of b≥0. The term 2log 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) in Equation (5) serves as a penalty factor as log t and −2log 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) are 
negatively correlated. Further, the term 2log 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) ensures log(𝐻𝐻1/𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡) diverges to infinity even if 
                                                          
29 Because Qatar, the largest supplier, which provided one third of the LNG volume in the spot market over the 
sample period, is located in essentially equal distance to East Asia, Europe and South America, the cost differential 
due to transportation from Qatar to the three markets is negligible. 
30 According to Phillips and Sul (2007), the reason for excluding a fraction of data from the convergence test 
regression is to better focus on what might happen as the sample size gets larger. Based on simulation experiments, 
Phillips and Sul (2007) suggest setting r = 0.3. 
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b = 0. Phillips and Sul (2007) suggest using a left-tailed t-statistic with a Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation-Consistent (HAC) standard error for the estimated coefficient b.  
In case the null of convergence for the full group is rejected, it is possible that a subgroup of 
individual series converge (club convergence). Phillips and Sul (2007) also suggest an algorithm 
using repeated regression to identify converging clubs. They argue that evidence of club 
convergence is usually most apparent in the last portion of the time series and suggest a two-step 
procedure. The first step is to order the individual series according to some time series average of 
the last fraction of observations and the second step is to repeatedly run the convergence log t test 
on the first k (k ≥ 2) highest series to select a core convergence group. A core convergence group 
is formed by maximizing the t-statistic over k provided the null of convergence is not rejected for 
each k. If the null of convergence for k = 2 is rejected, then the highest series can be dropped. The 
procedure is repeated with successive series until a core subgroup is formed after which the 
remaining individual series are added to this subgroup one at a time and a convergence t-test is 
performed to determine whether that series should be included in the subgroup. In what follows, 
we perform this subgroup convergence test as well. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1  Results from Time-Varying Coefficient Regressions 
Figure 4 exhibits the pairwise time-varying regression coefficients (βt) along with the two 
standard deviation confidence band for the four regional spot LNG price indices (in log form).31 
Because of the dominant role of East Asia in LNG markets, LEAX was chosen as an anchor and 
                                                          
31 We also estimated the time-varying coefficient regressions (not in logs) for each pair of the regional spot LNG 
price indices. The results are qualitatively similar and available from authors upon request.  
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the other three LNG indices are regressed on LEAX. The results are reported in panel (a)-(c). In 
the Atlantic basin, because the average volume and price are both higher in South America than in 
Iberia and Northwest Europe, we choose to regress LIBX and LNWE, respectively, on LSAX and 
the results are displayed in panels (d) and (e). Finally, panel (f) shows the estimated coefficient of 
regressing LNWE on LIBX.  
Several patterns are worth noting. First, there is a varying degree of market integration 
between all six pairs of the four indices, for a majority of the sample period the estimated time-
varying coefficients are statistically different from zero. Second, currently spot LNG markets are 
still far from being fully integrated. Except for the pair of LIBX-LNWE which exhibits a higher 
elasticity of 0.65-0.75, the estimated coefficients for other pairs are far from unity. For example, 
the estimated coefficients range between 0.2-0.3 for the pair of LNWE-LEAX, 0.4-0.45 for LIBX-
LEAX, 0.4-0.5 for LNWE-LSAX, and 0.55-0.65 for LIBX-LSAX. Overall, it appears that the 
South America index (LSAX) has a higher relationship with the East Asia index (LEAX) than do 
the European indices and that, in the Atlantic basin, the Iberian index has a higher relation with 
the South America Index than does the Northwest Europe index. This can be largely understood 
from the liquidity perspective as the South American buyers, particularly Argentina and Brazil, 
rely on the spot market for their LNG supply and therefore compete directly with Asian buyers 
whereas, in southwest Europe (Iberia), the LNG market is still dominated by long-term contracts 
with spot and short-term contracts playing a supplemental role only.32 In fact, as we shall show, 
the Northwest Europe index mainly interacts with the price of NBP. It is less influenced by other 
                                                          
32 According to the industry magazine, Petroleum Economist (2013), Brazil has tried to avoid committing to long-
term contracts as the country’s energy mix is heavily influenced by the availability of hydropower and consequently 
its demand for LNG is likely to fluctuate significantly from year to year. Similarly, Argentina did not commit to 
long-term contracts as it had hoped it would be able to return to gas self-sufficiency with a resurgence of supply 
from shales and with the deregulation of the energy sector which should stimulate domestic supply and reduce 
demand.  
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LNG markets than the Iberian market because of some existing market barriers. Third, the degree 
of integration in spot LNG markets shows some seasonal movements. The estimated β coefficients 
tend to spike in winter months, presumably because fluctuation of demand is likely to be higher in 
winter because of unexpected weather conditions,33 which leads to more active spot trading and 
consequently, drives prices to a higher degree of integration. Fourth, in terms of trend, while the 
estimated regression coefficients are largely stable for the pairs in the Atlantic basin, a slightly 
upward trend is found in the LSAX-LEAX, and to a lesser extent, the LIBX-LEAX pair. This 
suggests an overall modestly increasing degree of market integration between the Pacific basin 
represented by EAX and the Atlantic basin represented by SAX and IBX as the spot market 
expands. The estimated β coefficients for the three pairs involving LNWE all experienced a sharp 
drop during the first half of 2014 before returning to their respective normal levels towards the end 
of the sample period. The drop is almost certainly related to the weak demand for spot LNG in 
Northwest Europe during this period and logistic constraints which separated the Northwest 
European market from Iberia, a point which we will turn to in the next section.  
Next, we estimate the time-varying coefficients by regressing each of the four regional spot 
LNG indices on the logged NBP price. As shown in Figure 5, while the NBP index displays a 
strong relationship with all four regional LNG indices, the two European indices (i.e. the NWE 
and IBX) tend to be more integrated with the NBP than EAX and SAX. Particularly, the elasticity 
of the NWE index with respect to NBP is fairly stable, fluctuating around 0.8-0.85 for most of the 
time during the sample period, indicating a higher degree of integration between the two markets. 
In contrast, the estimated coefficient for the pair of LEAX-LNBP ranges from 0.1 to 0.3 even after 
                                                          
33 For example, on February 14, 2014 the Wall Street Journal reported that “Energy prices aren't just soaring in the 
U.S. as a cold winter sets in. In Asia, liquefied natural gas has surged to a record”. 
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the Fukushima incident, suggesting little influence of the UK gas prices on the pricing of spot LNG 
in Asia.  
Given that the pricing of a significant share of long-term LNG contracts are still linked to 
the price of crude oil or that of refined oil products, one may argue that it is the price of crude oil 
rather than gas-on-gas competition that underlies market integration in LNG markets. To address 
this issue, we follow Neumann’s approach (2009) by examining the time-varying coefficients on 
natural gas price data adjusted for the price of crude oil. Specifically, as a first step, we regress 
each of the LNG indices on crude oil prices represented by the price of Brent oil using ordinary 
least squares and generate a set of residual time series (𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) as in equation (6): 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿 = 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡         (6) 
In the second step, we use equation (7) to generate the adjusted LNG price series (𝑝𝑝�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿) by 
first normalizing the standard deviation of the residual series (𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗) to the standard deviation of the 
original LNG price (𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿) and then adding back the mean of the original price ( 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿): 
𝑝𝑝�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿 =
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗∙𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗
𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿
𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗
+  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿 .      (7) 
In doing so, the generated price series should be uncorrelated with the price of oil, but highly 
correlated with the price of LNG. Finally, we re-estimate the time-varying coefficients for each 
pair of the generated price series and plot the results in Figure 6.  
Notably, the patterns of the estimated coefficients in Figure 6 are strikingly similar to those 
depicted in Figure 4. In terms of the magnitude, the estimated coefficients for LSAX-LEAX and 
LIBX-LEAX are noticeably lower than their counterparts in Figure 4 but still statistically 
significant, suggesting the oil price might still play a role in linking the spot LNG prices between 
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the Pacific and Atlantic basins.34 Interestingly, the estimated coefficients of LNWE-LIBX are 
slightly higher in the generated series than in the original series, indicating a slightly higher degree 
of market integration between the two markets when the effect of the oil price is purged off. The 
estimated coefficients for other pairs are almost identical to those reported in Figure 4. Thus, we 
conclude from this exercise that the varying degree of market integration in the spot LNG markets 
appears to be mainly driven by gas-on-gas competition rather than by links to the oil price as found 
in previous studies. 
5.2  Results from Phillips-Sul Convergence Test 
Since the Phillips-Sul (2007) methodology focuses on the long-term trend, following Li et 
al. (2014), we apply the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with a smoothing parameter (λ) of 270400 to 
the logged price series to remove the transitional components and test the convergence among the 
HP trend components of the logged price indices. To visualize the relative transition paths to the 
cross-section average, we calculate the transition parameters ht according to Equation (4) for the 
four HP trend of LNG indices. Figure 7a displays the transition paths. 35 The tendency of a path 
moving towards unity is considered as evidence for convergence. As shown in Figure 7a, the 
LEAX and LSAX, and to a lesser extent LIBX, have a clear tendency to move towards unity. In 
contrast, the LNWE initially moves in the same direction as the LIBX, but diverges from the rest 
until the second half of 2014 after which it also moves towards unity. LNWE appears to be 
somehow driven by a different force than that of other indices until the end of the sample period. 
Given the close similarity between NBP and NWE as shown in Figure 2, we perform a separate 
                                                          
34 Assuming the estimated coefficients are independent from their counterparts in Figure 4, a test of the mean 
coefficients strongly rejects the null hypothesis that they are equal at 1% level for LSAX-LEAX, LIBX-LEAX, and 
LNWE-LIBX.   
35 As suggested by Phillips and Sul (2007), the first 30 percent of observations, the period from the week of August 
2, 2010 to December 05, 2011, are excluded to avoid the initial effect. This applies to the Log t test below.   
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transition analysis for the LNWE and LNBP pair only in Figure 7b. Indeed, the figure displays a 
tight relationship between their trend components. In what follows we formally test the hypothesis 
of convergence among the indices using the Phillips and Sul (2007) methodology.  
We start with a test for overall convergence among the four LNG indices as a group. The 
estimated equation with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard error is: 
log ( 𝐻𝐻1
𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗
) − 2 log 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) = −6.321 + 0.232 log 𝑡𝑡. 
                                                        (1.879) 
The t-statistic is reported in parenthesis. The null hypothesis of convergence among the four LNG 
indices cannot be rejected. This implies that despite the initial divergence after the Fukushima 
accident in 2011, the spot LNG prices are converging towards the end of the sample period.  
Even within the group convergence, it is interesting to identify the core convergence group 
among the spot LNG indices. Phillips and Sul (2007) suggest that if there is significant time series 
volatility, the individual time series may be ordered according to the averages of the last fraction 
(⅓ or ½) of each time series. The ordering of the four LNG indices according to the average of the 
last 60 observations is listed in the first column of Table 2. Using LEAX as the base, we perform 
the logt test by adding further indices one at a time. As reported in Table 2, the t-statistics are 7.236, 
7.151 and 1.879 for k = [1, 2], [1, 2, 3] and [1, 2, 3, 4], respectively. Thus, it can be concluded that 
LEAX and LSAX constitute the core group, which is not surprising given the transition paths 
depicted in Figure 7a.  
We are also interested in the interaction between NBP and the spot LNG indices. When 
LNBP is added, the Log t statistics for the group of five indices becomes -0.455 (also shown in 
Table 2) while the five percent critical value for the left-tailed t test is -1.645. Thus, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of overall convergence between spot LNG prices and the price of NBP. 
In addition, we also perform a convergence test for the pair of LNWE and LNBP. As reported in 
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the bottom row of Table 2, the resultant t-statistic is -1.038 and hence we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of convergence between LNWE and LNBP.  
In sum, there is strong evidence that the spot LNG price indices are converging in the period 
after the Fukushima accident, with EAX and SAX being the core group. We can also conclude that 
the spot LNG prices are converging with the price of NBP because we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of convergence. The results appear to be consistent with our conjecture about the 
change of market power of the leading supplier, Qatar, in the wake of the Fukushima accident and 
the negative demand shock in Europe over the 2012-2013 period. As the effects of the shocks 
dissipate over time, the LNG market converges to a more competitive equilibrium towards the end 
of the sample period.  
Finally, it is somewhat surprising that the price of spot LNG in Northwest Europe did not 
converge with other regional indices until late 2014. There are two plausible explanations. The 
first is logistic constraints between the Spanish and French gas pipeline networks. If there were no 
logistic barriers between the Iberian market and Northwest Europe, competition in the pipeline gas 
market would push gas prices in the two markets to converge. However, at least prior to the end 
of 2013, there is limited interconnection capacity from Southern France into Spain and also 
between South and North France (Timera Energy, 2013). As such, the Iberian market was largely 
separated from the Northwest Europe market (see the joint report by Naturgas energia et al., 
2009).36 With the upgrade and development of new interconnection capacity between Spain and 
South France, the relative separation should decline.37 Second, since in the East Asia and Iberian 
                                                          
36 There is also anecdotal evidence. For example, speaking at meeting attended by leaders of France, Spain and 
Portugal along with European Commission President in March 2015, the Spanish Industry and Energy Minister said 
"If there was an interconnection between Spain and the rest of Europe, Europe's vulnerability … would decrease." 
http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/south-west-europe-the-new-energy-frontier-22517.   
37 The upgrade of the west corridor of the interconnection was completed by end of 2013. The east corridor is 
expected to enter into operation by 2016 (European Commission, 2013).  
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markets the spot LNG competes with supplies of LNG or pipeline gas with long-term contracts 
whose prices are usually oil-indexed, yet the LNG import in Northwest Europe mainly compete in 
liquid gas markets, it is possible that the decoupling of oil and gas prices during the sample period 
also plays a role in the price non-convergence. Notably, as shown in Figure 6, when the effect of 
the oil price was removed the estimated coefficients turned slightly lower between IBX, SAX and 
EAX and slightly higher for IBX and NWE. The pattern could be consistent with this conjecture 
in that indexation to oil prices could reinforce the relationship between IBX, SAX and EAX, but 
weaken the link between IBX and NWE. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper provides the first empirical evaluation on the degree of integration and price 
convergence in four regional spot LNG markets using weekly data from August 2010 to February 
2015. A conceptual framework of market integration in the context of LNG market is laid out. 
Estimating a time-varying parameters model, we find that there exists a varying degree of 
integration among the spot LNG indices and this integration appears to be driven more by 
competition in LNG markets than their links to oil prices. However, we also notice that the 
integration in spot LNG market is far from complete, with the elasticity between two price indices 
barely different from zero in some cases. We then employed Phillips and Sul’s (2007) 
methodology to test whether the market indices after the Fukushima accident are converging 
towards an equilibrium implied by perfect competition. The test finds clear evidence of price 
convergence between the spot LNG prices and also between spot LNG and NBP prices, 
particularly towards the end of the sample period. The results are consistent with predictions from 
a model of LNG market where the major supplier have market power across different markets and 
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the level of market power could change following a large demand shock such as the Fukushima 
accident.  
A global gas market will occur only if the markets for LNG are reasonably integrated. Our 
convergence test results lends additional confidence that such a market might emerge as the 
volume of LNG available for spot and short-term markets further increases and infrastructure for 
interconnection improves in the future.    
A limitation of our study is the relative short time span of the sample period which may 
prevent us from finding a stable long-run equilibrium between the price indices, which warrants 
further research as the market grows. We are also silent on the interaction between spot market 
prices and the prices of long-term contracts, which may be another area for further research, both 
theoretically and empirically.    
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Figure 1 Spot and short-term LNG trade  
 
Notes: Short-term trade refers to trades under contracts of less than 4 years duration. The columns (the 
left axis) depicts the volume of spot and short-term LNG trade and the line (the right axis) depicts the 
share of spot and short term trade in total LNG trade for a given year.  Data source: GIIGNL (2014) “The 
LNG Industry 2014”. 
 
 
Figure 2  Spot LNG Market Share (2011-2014 Average) 
 
Note: The market share is calculated as the share of import volume, by region, in the total spot LNG trade 
over the period of 2011-2014. Data source: GIIGNL, “The LNG Industry”, various years.  
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Figure 3  Spot LNG Prices 
 
(Data source: ICIS) 
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Figure 4  Time varying coefficients between spot LNG indices          
          
(a)                           (b) 
 
         
(c)                                                   (d) 
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(e)                                                   (f) 
 
Notes: This figure depicts the time-varying coefficient estimates of regressing Y on X as in equation 2.1 and 2.2. In each panel, the first index 
indicates Y and the second indicates X. For example, the first panel depicts the random walk coefficient (red line) along with the two standard 
deviation confidence band (green lines) of regressing LSAX on LEAX.       
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Figure 5 Time varying coefficients with NBP 
      
(a)                           (b) 
     
(c)                           (d) 
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Figure 6 Time-varying coefficients when oil price was purged off
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Notes: This figure depicts the time-varying coefficient estimates of regressing Y on X with the generated LNG price index data (equation 6-7). In 
each panel, the first index indicates Y and the second indicates X. For example, the first panel depicts the random walk coefficient (red line) along 
with the two standard deviation confidence band (green lines) of regressing LSAX on LEAX, both of which are uncorrelated with the price of oil.       
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Figure 7a  Relative Transition Paths of the LNG Indices 
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Figure 7b   Relative Transition Paths for LNWE and LNBP 
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Table 1 Tests for Unit Root and Cointegration 
 
Panel A. Unit Root Tests 
 ADF PP KPSS 
LEAX -1.762 (0.399) -1.268 (0.645) 0.441* 
LIBX -2.100 (0.245) -1.866 (0.348) 0.841*** 
LSAX -2.319 (0.167) -1.817 (0.372) 0.782*** 
LNBP -2.589* (0.097) -2.604* (0.094) 0.287 
LNWE -3.071** (0.030) -2.546 (0.106) 0.350* 
Notes: The sample period is 08/02/2010 – 2/23/2015. All price indices are in natural logarithms. 
Lag lengths in the ADF test are selected by the Akaike information criterion (SIC). The PP test 
and the KPSS test use the Bartlett kernel with the Newey-West bandwidth. P-values are included 
in parentheses. The superscripts, ***, **, and *, denote the rejection of the null at the 
significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
 
Panel B. Johansen Cointegration Tests 
Variables H0: 
rank = r 
Trace Statistic Max. Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
Lag 
Length 
LEAX & LIBX r = 0 13.216 (0.347) 10.634 (0.280) 5 
 r ≤ 1 2.582 (0.661) 2.582 (0.661)  
LEAX & LSAX r = 0 10.392 (0.601) 7.584 (0.598) 5 
 r ≤ 1 2.808 (0.617) 2.808 (0.617)  
LIBX & LSAX r = 0 20.745** (0.043) 17.192** (0.031) 1 
 r ≤ 1 3.556 (0.482) 3.556 (0.482)  
LEAX & LNWE r = 0 15.674 (0.190) 12.547 (0.156) 5 
 r ≤ 1 3.127 (0.557) 3.127 (0.557)  
LIBX & LNWE r = 0 16.535 (0.151) 10.023 (0.3323) 1 
 r ≤ 1 6.512 (0.155) 6.512 (0.155)  
LSAX & LNWE  r = 0 21.882** (0.030) 16.995** (0.034) 1 
 r ≤ 1 4.886 (0.296) 4.886 (0.296)  
Notes: Lag length (in first differences of logged price indices) is selected by the AIC. No 
deterministic trend is allowed in the tests. P-values are included in parentheses. The superscripts, 
***, **, and *, denote the rejection of the null at the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively.
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Table 2  Convergence Test Results 
Order Name t-stat  
1 LEAX base Core 
2 LSAX 7.236 Core 
3 LIBX 7.151  
4 LNWE 1.879  
5 LNBP -0.455  
    
 LNWE, LNBP -1.038  
Note: The table reports the t-statistics with HAC standard errors of the logt coefficient in 
equation (5). The first column shows the ordering of the series according to the average of the 
last 1/3 observations. The t-statistics are respectively for k = [1, 2], [1, 2, 3], [1, 2, 3, 4] and [1, 2, 
3, 4, 5] with 166 degree of freedom.  
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Appendix: The Ritz (2014) LNG Market Model 
Consider an LNG supplier M which sells LNG to other markets. Let 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ,𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖,𝑌𝑌−𝑖𝑖) 
denote the inverse demand function faced by the supplier in market i (i=1, 2, …N), where 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is the 
spot price of LNG, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 is the quantity sold by the supplier to market i on the spot market, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 is the 
quantity of LNG sold on long-term contract basis to market i, 𝑋𝑋−𝑖𝑖 and 𝑌𝑌−𝑖𝑖 are respectively the 
quantity supplied by all other suppliers in the spot and long-term contract markets. Let Ti denote 
the unit transportation cost for shipping LNG from supplier M to market i. If arbitrage occurs 
between markets i and j, then the transport cost is Tji consistent with the preceding notation.  
Let C(.) denote the supplier’s cost function which depends on the sum of total quantities of 
sold in all N markets, including both spot and contract sales. Assuming the volume sold on the 
long-term contract is given, the supplier’s profit-maximizing problem is: 
Max 𝜋𝜋 = ∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 − 𝐶𝐶(∑ (𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) − ∑ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖    (A.1) 
 subject to  (∑ (𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) ≤ 𝑄𝑄� 
where 𝑄𝑄� is the production capacity constraint. The first order conditions of (1) require that  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 − 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗 − 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗  for all i ≠ j.       (A.2) 
where 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖  is the marginal revenue from selling into spot market i. The first order condition 
suggests that the profit-maximizing supplier would equate the marginal revenue net of 
transportation cost from selling into market i to that of selling into market j. Let 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 denote the price 
elasticity of demand faced by the supplier in market i. The supplier’s marginal revenue from 
market i can be rewritten as: 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(1 − 1/𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖) and we have 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖−𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
=  𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖−1
[� 1
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
− 1
𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗
� + (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖−𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
)].                                                                             (A.3)  
 
